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PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS AS A STRAND OF POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: DRIVING FORCES, 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES, AND DILEMMAS 
Binendri Perera† 
Abstract:  Constitutional democracies claim themselves to be constructed upon the 
will of the people. As the agency gap between the rulers and the ruled widens, people are 
increasingly more frustrated and compelled to actively take a stand. Advances of 
technology and social mobilization give increasing opportunities for the people to directly 
express their will and call for accountability from their representatives. Against this 
backdrop, this paper engages in a comparative analysis of people’s movements that 
happened and are continuing to take place in South Korea, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and 
Algeria. Based on the analysis, the paper maps out the common weaknesses in the 
constitutional and political structures of each of these countries and thereby highlights the 
distinctive features of these people’s movements. The paper conceptualizes constitutional 
movements of people as a specific instance of popular constitutionalism wherein people 
challenge their representatives and directly assert the constitutional principles. These 
people’s movements, while being formidable, face complicated dilemmas in their quest to 
establish constitutional norms in their countries. 
Cite as: Binendri Perera, People’s Movements as a Strand of Popular Constitutionalism: 
Driving Forces, Distinctive Features, and Dilemmas, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 341 (2020). 
  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Constitutional democracies claim themselves to be constructed upon 
the will of the people. The constituent authority of people is invoked as a grand 
principle of their formation to validate the constitution and nation built 
thereunder. However, in the republican model of governance, people directly 
 
† LL.B. (Hons.) (Colombo), LL.M. (Harvard), Attorney-at-Law (Sri Lanka). The author currently 
teaches a course on the Legal System of Sri Lanka and its Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Colombo. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Klarman for his mentorship and 
feedback on the paper, Jennifer Allison for assistance with research, June Casey for assistance with 
publication, Jane Bestor for her comments, and the HLS Summer Academic Fellowship Program 2019 
through which this paper was written. 
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engage in governance only in limited circumstances. Representatives of the 
people have effectively been the oracles to pronounce the people’s will and 
were generally considered competent to implement their will while the people 
themselves remained more passive. However, advances of technology and 
social mobilization have given increasing opportunities for the people to 
directly express their will, rather than relying on their representatives. As the 
agency gap between the rulers and the ruled widens, people are increasingly 
more frustrated and compelled to actively take a stand.  
Against this backdrop, people’s movements that happened and are 
continuing to take place in Sri Lanka, South Korea, Venezuela and Algeria are 
analyzed from a comparative perspective. Based on the analysis, the common 
weaknesses in the constitutional and political structures of each of these 
countries are mapped and thereby, the distinctive features of these people’s 
movements are highlighted. People’s movements that seek to assert 
constitutional principles are conceptualized as a strand of popular 
constitutionalism. These movements are a response to the weaknesses in 
constitutional structures of those countries, whereby the elected 
representatives of the people can abuse the constitutions for their personal and 
partisan gain. These people’s movements, while being formidable, face 
complicated dilemmas in their quest to assert and establish constitutional 
principles.   
II. PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD FROM 2016 TO 2019  
This paper analyses a number of specific instances where people 
challenged the ruling elite of their countries, demanding that they adhere to 
the constitutional principles such as rule of law, democracy and a system of 
checks and balances. The movements in focus are the Candlelight Protests of 
South Korea from 2016 to 2017, Sri Lanka’s public protests during the 
constitutional coup 2018, Venezuela’s 2019 protests and Algerian protests 
dubbed the Smile Revolution of 2019. These movements depict the 
engagement of people in the constitutional governance of their countries 
during the period of 2016 to 2019 in the regions of East Asia, South Asia, 
Latin America and Africa. This period has seen numerous protests across the 
globe advocating various social and political causes.1 Focus upon these 
 
1  Juliana Kaplan & Allana Akhtar, World on fire: Here Are All the Major Protests Happening Around 
the Globe Right Now, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 23. 2019, 2:11AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/all-the-
protests-around-the-world-right-now. 
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particular countries is to conceptualize people’s movements in terms of 
constitutional structures of their country and the constitutional principles they 
were asserting through their protests. 
A. South Korean Candlelight Protests  
Candlelight Protests in South Korea occurred from 2016 to 2017, 
during which almost one third of the population participated in protesting the 
corruption and abuse of power by their President Park Geun-Hye and her 
advisors.2 Unofficial presidential advisor Choi Soon-sil was found to have 
solicited personal favors and pressured conglomerates, including Samsung, to 
provide donations for her non-profit organizations.3 President Park was 
accused of aiding her friend.4 The protests compelled the legislature to take a 
stand against the President and Constitutional Court of South Korea and 
confirmed the impeachment in a unanimous vote.5  President Park then faced 
trial and was convicted for bribery, extortion, abuse of power and other 
criminal charges,6 alongside her advisor and the heir of Samsung group.7  
B. Sri Lankan Protests Against the Constitutional Coup of 2018 
Sri Lankan President, Maithripala Sirisena, triggered immediate citizen 
protests, by appointing Mahinda Rajapaksa as the Prime Minister when he did 
not have the constitutional authority to remove the incumbent Prime Minister, 
Ranil Wickremasinghe. Sri Lankans started their protests demanding for the 
parliament, which the president had arbitrarily prorogued, to be reconvened 
to assess which prime minister had the majority support in parliament. 
Protestors called out the parliamentarians who were crossing the floor in the 
 
2  Alexis Dudden, Revolution by Candlelight: How South Koreans Toppled a Government, DISSENT 
(2017), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/revolution-by-candlelight-how-south-koreans-toppled-a-
government.  
3  South Korea Jails Choi Soon-Sil, Friend to Park Geun-hye, for Corruption, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43042862; South Korea’s Presidential Scandal, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37971085. 
4  South Korea’s Presidential Scandal, supra note 3. 
5  Paula Hancocks, Park Geun-hye: Downfall of South Korea’s Political Princess, CNN WORLD (Mar. 
30, 2017, 11:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/09/asia/south-korea-park-geun-hye-profile/index.html. 
6  Choe Sang-Hun, Park Geun-Hye, Ex-South Korean Leader, Gets 25 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/world/asia/park-geun-hye-sentenced-south-
korea.html. 
7  South Korea Jails Choi Soon-Sil, supra note 3.  
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parliament for personal gain,8 and demanded for the Speaker of the Parliament 
to take a stand to uphold the constitution.9 Simultaneously, local blogs and 
electronic newspapers became platforms for sharing news and also educating 
the citizens about the complex constitutional issues involved.10 People 
challenged the president’s conduct during the constitutional coup through 
petitions and direct letters.11 The president’s denounced conduct included 
interfering with the parliamentary process,12 arbitrary transfers of a senior 
police officer in charge of investigating several politically sensitive crimes,13 
and making homophobic comments at a rally.14 When the president dissolved 
the parliament in violation of the constitution, the protestors called for the 
Election Commission and the courts to uphold the constitution.15 These 
protests continued peacefully through the entire duration of the constitutional 
coup until the Supreme Court decisions restored the status quo. The Court 
invalidated the president’s Proclamation dissolving the Parliament and 
 
8  S.W.R. de A Samarasinghe, Sri Lanka’s Democracy in Peril, THE ISLAND (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:00 
PM), http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=194276. 
9  Sri Lankans Denounce the “Coup” and Constitutional Crisis, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Nov. 2, 2018, 2:45 
PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-11-02/sri-lankans-denounce-coup-and-constitutional-crisis. 
10  See Agence France-Presse, Thousands of Sri Lankans Protest Ousting of PM Ranil Wickremesinghe, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:51 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-
asia/article/2170943/tens-thousands-sri-lankans-march-support-ousted-prime-minister. 
11  Devanesan Nesiah, An Open Letter to President Maithripala Sirisena, GROUNDVIEWS (Nov. 7, 
2018), https://perma.cc/32K2-P4AN; Lasantha’s Daughter Writes Moving Letter to Sirisena Against Attempt 
to Transfer CID OIC Nishantha Silva, COLOMBO TEL. (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/lasanthas-daughter-writes-moving-letter-to-sirisena-against-
attempt-to-transfer-cid-oic-nishantha-silva/; No Constitution = No Democracy: A Statement by 900 Sri 
Lankan Students on #CoupLK, GROUNDVIEWS, https://perma.cc/SBA3-68L3. 
12  Sri Lanka Political Crisis: How Citizens Are “Taking a Stand” for Democracy, BUS. STANDARD 
(Nov. 7, 2018, 6:46 IST), https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/sri-lanka-political-crisis-
how-citizens-are-taking-a-stand-for-democracy-118110700075_1.html. 
13  CID’s IP Nishantha Silva Transferred, DAILY MIRROR (Nov. 19, 2018, 10:33 AM), 
https://perma.cc/Z6YK-42BA; Lasantha’s Daughter Writes Moving Letter, supra note 11; Police 
Commission Cancels Transfer of CID Inspector Nishantha Silva, DAILY FT (Nov. 20, 2018), 
http://www.ft.lk/front-page/Police-Commission-cancels-transfer--of-CID-Inspector-Nishantha-Silva/44-
667198. 
14  President Under Fire Over “Butterfly” Comments, COLOMBO GAZETTE (Nov. 6, 2018, 8:35 AM), 
https://perma.cc/4AYY-RYD6; Sirisena Should Be Held Responsible for Homophobic Incidents in Sri Lanka 
in Coming Days: Sri Lankan LGBTIQ+ Community, COLOMBO TEL. (Nov. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/JJM3-
JL3E. 
15  No Constitution = No Democracy, supra note 11. 
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refused to recognize the appointment of a Prime Minister who doesn’t 
command the majority in Parliament.16   
C. Venezuelan Protests of 2019 
Citizen protests in Venezuela began in January 2019, with their 
opposition-led, National State Assembly President Juan Guaidó, challenging 
the authoritarian president, Nicolas Maduro, who won the previous election 
through fraudulent measures.17 Maduro announced that he won the 2018 
election, but the election results were declared invalid by the legislature and 
Guaidó was declared to be the interim president.18 Maduro rejected this 
challenge and the country plunged into a crisis.19 Despite people’s protests 
which continued during early 2019, Maduro resorted to threats backed by the 
military in response to the opposition.20 The regime has also taken harsh 
measures against allies of Guaidó in the legislature, within the military and 
protestors in the streets.21 Political leaders have had to either go into hiding or 
seek foreign protection through embassies.22  
 
16  Supreme Court of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 13/12/2018, “R. Sampanthan et. 
al. v Attorney-General,” SC FR Application No. 351/2018 (Sri Lanka); Sri Lanka Supreme Court Says 
Rajapaksa Is Still Prevented from Acting as PM, ASIAN TRIBUNE (Nov. 14, 2018, 19:40 PM), 
https://perma.cc/Q4VP-LSC6. 
17  Jeffery D. Pugh, Foreign Allies Should Take Their Cues from Venezuelan Activists’ Push for 
Democracy, THE GLOBAL POST (Feb. 7, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/2019/02/07/venezuela-opposition-
democracy/.  
18  Georgina Laud, Venezuela Crisis: Corruption Scale Reveal – How Maduro Government Failed 
Venezuela, EXPRESS (Feb. 4, 2019, 14:12 PM), https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1081359/venezuela-
crisis-corruption-scale-president-maduro-government-failed-venezuelans. 
19  Id.  
20  Agencies, Venezuelan Crisis: Maduro Displays Military Might as US Warns of “Significant 
Response” to Threats Against Diplomats, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 28, 2019, 00:48 AM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-crisis-nicolas-maduro-army-juan-guaido-
us-john-bolton-a8749566.html. 
21  See Moisés Naím, What Has a Bigger Impact, Elections or Street Protests?, EL PAÍS (Jun. 19, 2019, 
06:18 EDT), https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/06/19/inenglish/1560937997_603402.html; Venezuela Death 
Squads Kill Young Men, Stage Scenes, UN Report Says, REUTERS (Jul. 5, 2019, 9:09 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/world/americas/article/3017337/venezuela-death-squads-kill-young-men-
stage-scenes-un-report. 
22  See Lucía Abellán, Venezuelan Opposition Leader Seeks Refugee in Spanish Embassy in Caracas, 
EL PAÍS (May 2, 2019, 05:08 EDT), https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/05/01/inenglish/ 
1556713845_723006.html. 
346 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 2 
 
Guaidó and his allies have directly appealed to the military to join ranks 
with them, but this has not received a positive response.23 Even the soldiers 
who defected and wore blue arm bands in support of Guaidó later removed 
such external expressions of rebellion for fear of harassment. 24 The citizens 
were facing crippling living conditions due to shortages of basic needs such 
as food, medicine, and electricity.25 While Maduro opened the borders to 
Brazil and Aruba in an attempt to restore normalcy to the country, economic 
and political instability continues.26 Protests were to continue as the talks 
between the Venezuelan government and the opposition in Norway ended 
without an agreement.27 People have stated that they are determined to carry 
on their protests until democracy is restored.28  
D. Algerian Smile Revolution of 2019 
Algeria is a North African country that avoided mass demonstrations 
during 2011 Arab Spring only because their president Bouteflika lifted a 
nineteen-year-old state of emergency rule and promised further constitutional 
reform.29 Arab Spring was a series of public protests in 2011 during which the 
people in Middle Eastern and Northern African countries protested against 
authoritarianism and corruption of their governments.30 However, underlying 
causes that gave rise to the Arab Spring remained unresolved in Algeria and 
the country’s public is taking up a late blooming Arab Spring in 2019.31 
Algerians started their protests, dubbed the “Smile Revolution,” on February 
 
23  See Kejal Vyas, Venezuelan Crisis: Violence Erupts as Guaidó Calls for Uprising, WALL ST. J. 
(May 1, 2019, 10:10 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuelas-guaido-says-he-has-support-from-
members-of-military-11556622855. 
24  Id.; Backers “Failed to Follow Through” Uprising: Guaidó, GULF TODAY (May 7, 2019) 
https://www.gulftoday.ae/news/2019/05/07/backers-failed-to-follow--through-uprising-guaido. 
25  Venezuela Faces Gas Shortages, NPR, (Jun. 19, 2019, 5:07 AM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/19/733955656/venezuela-faces-gas-shortages. 
26  See Brian Ellsworth, Venezuela Reopens Borders with Brazil and Aruba, Official Says, REUTERS 
(May 10, 2019, 8:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-border/venezuela-reopens-
borders-with-brazil-and-aruba-official-idUSKCN1SG1QF. 
27  Venezuela’s Guaidó Vows Protests as Norway Talks Produce No Deal, ALJAZEERA (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/venezuelan-government-opposition-envoys-talks-deal-
190530160246998.html. 
28  See id.  
29  See Adel Abdel Ghafar & Anna L. Jacobs, Lessons for Algeria from the 2011 Egyptian Uprising, 
BROOKINGS (March 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/lessons-for-algeria-from-the-2011-
egyptian-uprising/. 
30  Arab Spring, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2020).  
31  Ghafar & Jacobs, supra note 29. 
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22, 2019, when their authoritarian leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced that 
he would run for president for the fifth time.32 The eighty-two-year-old has 
not made an appearance in public for several years and his officials have had 
to assure that he is indeed alive.33 The Algerian elite forged ahead to keep the 
ailing president in office so that their status and privileges can be preserved.34  
Despite harsh repression from state authorities, protestors persisted and 
maintained that Bouteflika should not run for a fifth term.35 Like many of their 
Middle-Eastern and North African neighbors, Algeria is a country with a 
youth bulge, wherein two thirds of the population are below the age of thirty.36 
This youth population is frustrated by the lack of employment opportunities, 
deteriorating economy and diminishing quality of life.37 President Bouteflika 
withdrew his candidacy on March 11, 2019 and resigned from office in April 
2, 2019 due to public pressure.38 The military joined forces with the public 
and attempted to appear as the guardian of the constitution in order to ensure 
a smooth transition of power through the presidential elections that were 
supposed to be held on July 4, within ninety days of the resignation of the 
president as per Article 102 of the Algerian Constitution.39  
However, people realized that this presidential election was not 
guaranteed to be a free and fair election, and the military and elite were 
attempting to preserve the existing form of governance.40 In response to this 
turn of events, the people transformed their demands from removal of 
Bouteflika to resignation of the interim president and the prime minister as 
well as anyone who is tainted by the previous regime.41 They further 
 
32  See Shirley Le Penne, Algeria: Learning to Smile, THE JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 21, 2019, 22:13), 
https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Algeria-Learning-to-smile-584216; Sharan Grewal, Algeria’s Army Calls 
for the President’s Removal, BROOKINGS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2019/03/27/algerias-army-calls-for-the-presidents-removal. 
33  Le Penne, supra note 32. 
34  See id. 
35  Grewal, supra note 32. 
36  Jason Burke & Ruth Michaelson, Algeria’s Angry Youth Ready to Rise Up to Topple Ailing 
President, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/10/algeria-youth-
rise-up-against-ageing-leaders. 
37  See id.  
38  Sharan Grewal, Bouteflika’s Bid for Time, BROOKINGS (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/14/bouteflikas-bid-for-time. 
39  See id. 
40  See Algeria Protestors Demand End to Regime After Bouteflika’s Fall, BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47830156. 
41  Id.; see also Ahmad Al-Sholi, The End of Absurdity in Algeria, JACOBIN (Apr. 21, 2019), 
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/04/algeria-protests-abdelaziz-bouteflika-corruption-economy. 
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demanded that the military not interfere in restoration of country’s 
democracy.42 People have insisted upon the fall of the regime, despite clear 
examples of dangers that resulting instability would cause to the nation as is 
evident through countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria.43 Constitutional 
Council cancelled the presidential election to be held on July 4, 2019 keeping 
abreast with the popular demand.44 Therefore, Algeria has bravely taken up to 
the possibility for a democratic transformation through negotiations not 
restricted by the procedures of the current constitution. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AS A DRIVING FORCE OF PEOPLE’S 
MOVEMENTS  
Despite the unique historical, social and cultural circumstances of each 
country, their constitutional structures show several similarities. Firstly, these 
countries are either presidential systems or semi-presidential systems whereby 
the excessive executive powers are vested in a single individual. Secondly, 
each of these executive presidents once in power have engaged in abusive 
constitutionalism to further entrench themselves in their personal capacity.45 
Thirdly, political opposition has been weak or scattered due to the political 
trajectory of the country and the person or the party in power have also 
systematically repressed opposing parties.  
A. Presidential or Semi-Presidential Systems of Governance  
The South Korean constitution was created under the influence of the 
United States occupation and engagement in the country’s domestic affairs, 
even though the constitution was not written with direct intervention of United 
States as was done in Japan.46 The South Korean Constitution of 1948 created 
 
42  See 6th Friday of Protest: Algerians Call for Army Chief of Staff to Step Down, EFE (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/6th-friday-of-protest-algerians-call-for-army-chief-staff-to-step-
down/50000262-3939036); see also Heba Saleh, Algerian Opposition Calls on Army to Stay Out of Politics, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/069dcfb4-4a52-11e9-bbc9-6917dce3dc62. 
43  See generally Jason Brownlee, Takrek Masoud & Andrew Reynolds, THE ARAB SPRING: PATHWAYS 
OF REPRESSION AND REFORM (2015); ARAB SPRING: THE HOPE AND REALITY OF THE UPRISINGS (Mark L. 
Haas & David W. Lesch eds., 2016). 
44  Adam Nossiter, Algeria Cancels Presidential Election, Setting Up New Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 
2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/world/africa/algeria-elections-canceled.html. 
45  See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 195 (2013) (defining 
“abusive constitutionalism” as the “use of mechanisms of constitutional change in order to make a state 
significantly less democratic than it was before”). 
46  See Chaihark Hahm & Sung Ho Kim, To Make “We the People”: Constitutional Founding in 
Postwar Japan and South Korea, INT’L J. CONST. L. 801–05 (2010). 
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an indirectly elected presidency.47 But after successive regimes of 
authoritarian leadership, the constitutional amendment of 1987 introduced a 
directly elected presidency with the aim of increasing the accountability of the 
office to the public.48 However, the president continues to enjoy wide ranging 
executive powers under Chapter IV, as the head of the state49 and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.50 
Sri Lanka has also followed the French constitutional model in its 1978 
constitution,51 providing vast powers to the executive president. The 
legislature is subject to constitutional and more far-reaching political control 
of the president and the president is protected from judicial scrutiny by a 
strong immunity clause provided by Article 35.52 The president is also 
virtually immune from the political scrutiny of the parliament due to the 
stringent impeachment process stated in Article 38(2) of the constitution,53 
 
47  See Constitutional History of South Korea, CONSTITUTIONNET (Apr. 2018), 
http://constitutionnet.org/country/republic-korea. 
48  Kyong-Whan Ahn, The Rule of Law in South Korea: Insights into the Social Evolution During the 
Two Decades with the New Constitution (1987-2007), (Oct. 2007) (unpublished article), 
https://www.coursehero.com/file/31057651/ahn-paperdoc/. 
49  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 66 (S. Kor.) (the Korean President is 
not only the head of the state but has the “responsibility and duty to safeguard the independence, territorial 
integrity and continuity of the state and the Constitution . . . [and] (4) [e]xecutive power shall be vested in 
the Executive Branch headed by the President.”). 
50  Id. art. 74 (“(1) The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under the 
conditions as prescribed by the Constitution and Act. (2) The organization and formation of the Armed Forces 
shall be determined by Act.”). 
51  Suri Ratnapala, Sri Lanka at the Constitutional Crossroads: Gaullist Presidentialism, Westminster 
Democracy or Tripartite Separation of Powers? LAWASIA J. 33, 34 (2003-2004). 
52  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC 1978, art. 35(1) (Sri Lanka) (“While any person holds office as 
President of the Republic of Sri Lanka, no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued 
against the President in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by the President, either in his official 
or private capacity: Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be read and construed as restricting the right 
of any person to make an application under Article 126 against the Attorney-General, in respect of anything 
done or omitted to be done by the President, in his official capacity: Provided further that the Supreme Court 
shall have no jurisdiction to pronounce upon the exercise of the powers of the President under Article 
33(2)(g). (2) Where provision is made by law limiting the time within which proceedings of any description 
may be instituted against any person, a period of time during which such person holds the office of President 
of the Republic of Sri Lanka shall not be taken into account in calculating any period of time prescribed by 
that law. (3) The immunity conferred by the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to proceedings in the 
Supreme Court under paragraph (2) of Article 129 and to proceedings under Article 130 (a) relating to the 
election of the President or the validity of a referendum.”). 
53  Id. art. 38(2)(a) (“Any Member of Parliament may, by a writing addressed to the Speaker, give 
notice of a resolution alleging that the President is permanently incapable of discharging the functions of his 
office by reason of mental or physical infirmity or that the President has been guilty of––(i) intentional 
violation of the Constitution, (ii) treason, (iii) bribery, (iv) misconduct or corruption involving the abuse of 
the powers of his office, or (v) any offence under any law, involving moral turpitude and setting out full 
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made impractical in practice because the president can prorogue the 
parliament under his power to summon, as well as dissolve the parliament in 
Article 33(2)(c) of the Sri Lankan Constitution 1978,54 to pressure the 
parliamentarians who might initiate impeachment proceedings. 
The 1991 constitution of Venezuela creates a five-branch government 
instead of three, introducing an electoral branch and a citizen branch. The 
constitution is also extremely progressive in its incorporation of international 
human rights treaties, enshrinement of economic, social and cultural rights, 
women’s rights and indigenous rights.55 However, the executive branch 
consists of a president, and the constitutional powers of the president qualifies 
Venezuela as one of the most powerful presidential systems of Latin 
America.56 The 1996 constitution shifted the authority to make military 
appointments from the legislature to the executive, giving president direct 
control of the military.57 This has been a crucial power for Maduro to continue 
in power amidst protests in 2019. Therefore, not only two but four other 
constitutionally co-equal branches of government have failed to keep the 
executive president in check.  
 
particulars of the allegation or allegations made and seeking an inquiry and report thereon by the Supreme 
Court. (b) No notice of such resolution shall be entertained by the Speaker or placed on the Order Paper of 
Parliament unless it complies with the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) and––(i)  such notice of resolution is 
signed by not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members of Parliament ; or (ii) such notice of 
resolution is signed by not less than one-half of the whole number of Members of Parliament and the Speaker 
is satisfied that such allegation or allegations merit inquiry and report by the Supreme Court. (c) Where such 
resolution is passed by not less than two thirds of the whole number of Members (including those not present) 
voting in its favor, the allegation or allegations contained in such resolution shall be referred by the Speaker 
to the Supreme Court for inquiry and report. (d) The Supreme Court shall, after due inquiry at which the 
President shall have the right to appear and to be heard, in person or by an attorney-at-law, make a report of 
its determination to Parliament together with the reasons therefor. (e) Where the Supreme Court reports to 
Parliament that in its opinion the President is permanently incapable of discharging the functions of his office 
by reason of mental or physical infirmity or that the President has been guilty of any of the other allegations 
contained in such resolution, as the case may be, Parliament may by a resolution passed by not less than two 
thirds of the whole number of Members (including those not present) voting in its favor remove the President 
from office.”). 
54  Id. art. 33(2)(c) (“In addition to the powers, duties and functions expressly conferred or imposed on, 
or assigned to the President by the Constitution or other written law, the President shall have the power… to 
summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament.”). 
55  See Gregory Wilpert, Venezuela’s New Constitution, VENEZUELA ANALYSIS (Aug. 27, 2003, 12:10 
AM), https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/70. 
56  See Constitutional History of Venezuela, CONSTITUTIONNET, 
http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-venezuela (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
57  See Wilpert, supra note 55. 
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The Algerian Constitution of 1996 provides for a powerful presidency, 
in which the president is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces as 
provided for in Article 77(1).58 According to Article 93 of the constitution, the 
president can further declare an emergency in consultation with the two 
presidents of the legislature.59 Article 96 allows the president to suspend the 
constitution and the fundamental freedoms of the people.60 Even though the 
constitution requires that the presidential candidates should either have fought 
in the war against French or do not descend from people who supported the 
French,61 executive powers accorded to Algerian president follows the French 
model. In fact, Article 77 powers of the Algerian president are very similar to 
the powers of the French presidents stated in Title II (Articles 5 to 19) of the 
French Constitution of 1958.62 
Therefore, countries in focus have all followed the American and 
French presidential systems, which have worked well in those countries due 
to the robustness of their constitutional norms. However, even these systems’ 
capacities have been checked time and again, with the first French president 
under the Fifth Republic, De Gaulle and America’s current president Donald 
Trump.63 Even these systems, which have a unique historical and cultural set 
up to sustain a powerful executive president within the constitutional limits, 
have been strained by particularly notorious individuals. Therefore, it is 
virtually inevitable that these models fail to restrain powerful leaders in East 
Asian, South Asian, Latin American and African countries. This is because 
constitutional principles are comparatively weakly embedded in these 
countries’ normative framework, for example, due to frequent constitutional 
amendments that weaken the system of checks and balances. 
The U.S. Constitution introduced an executive president who is 
accountable to the people and the other institutions of the state for his exercise 
 
58  The Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria art. 77, as amended. 
59  Id. art. 93, as amended (“When the country is threatened by an impending danger to its institutions, 
independence, or territorial integrity, the President of the Republic decrees the state of exception.”). 
60  Id. art. 96, as amended (“During the period of the state of war, the Constitution is suspended, the 
President of the Republic assumes all the powers.”). 
61  Id. art. 73, as amended. 
62  1985 CONST. 5-19 (Fr.).  
63  See DAVID FRUM, TRUMPOCRACY: THE CORRUPTION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2018); Fredric 
S. Burin, Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the Fifth French Republic, 33 SOCIAL RESEARCH 407, 
407–08 (1966). 
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of power. This was a deliberate move away from the British monarchy.64 
While the U.S. president is indirectly elected through electoral college, the 
countries in discussion all elect their president through direct elections to 
ensure legitimacy and accountability.65 Therefore, these countries 
constitutionally repose a higher trust in their presidents. Ironically, that trust 
is flouted, and the discretion is misused so blatantly in practice. There is a gap 
in traditional conception of constitutionalism because of the extensive powers 
and discretion accorded to the president,66 and the people’s movements, 
despite being haphazard and complex compared to the traditional institutional 
routes, have developed as a mechanism to directly question the abuse of 
presidential powers. 
B. Abusive Constitutionalism Tactics to Further Entrench Executive 
Powers  
David Landau, Mason Ladd Professor at Florida State University 
College of Law who mainly writes about comparative constitutional law, 
states that abusive constitutionalism consists of the mechanisms of 
constitutional amendment and replacement to weaken the leverage of political 
opposition and other institutions of state which act as a check against 
executive power.67 Because these measures exploit the formal mechanisms of 
constitutional change, they become entrenched within the supreme law of the 
land and enjoy symbolic legitimacy. Therefore, abusive constitutionalism that 
Landau illustrates is arguably more threatening than the abuse of unwritten 
constitutional practices.  
These abusive constitutional amendments, while following the formal 
constitutional procedures, in effect entrench a person or a party in power by 
changing the rules of the game, i.e., the framework of governance. Even 
though their culminative effect is to erode the quality of constitutional 
 
64  A Point of View: Is the US President an Elected Monarch?, BBC NEWS (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32741802. Eliga Gould, The American Founders Made Sure the 
President Could Never Suspend Congress, THE CONVERSATION (Sep. 4, 2019, 
http://theconversation.com/the-american-founders-made-sure-the-president-could-never-suspend-congress-
122703. 
65  Seonhwa Kim, Reforming South Korea’s “Imperial Presidency,” INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY (Oct. 2017), http://isdp.eu/publication/reforming-south-koreas-imperial-presidency/. 
66  See generally Larry Diamond, ILL WINDS: SAVING DEMOCRACY FROM RUSSIAN RAGE, CHINESE 
AMBITION AND AMERICAN COMPLACENCY (2019). Even countries such as Poland and Turkey moved towards 
semi-presidentialism and presidentialism in order to centralize power. 
67  See Landau, supra note 45, at 189. 
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democracy, Landau argues that tools of constitutional law are either incapable 
of restraining abusive constitutional mechanisms or are easily circumvented 
by the potential authoritarian leaders.68 This scenario is proven time and time 
again by the authoritarian leaders of South Korea, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and 
Algeria.  
South Korea’s dictators have successively removed presidential term 
limits. The First President elected under the system, Rhee Syngman, engaged 
in abusive constitutionalism to entrench himself and similar steps were taken 
under the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee.69 In response to political dissent 
and protests, Park Chung Hee declared martial law and amended the 
constitution so that he could be president for life.70 Therefore, the constitution 
of 1978 introduced a single presidential term of five years and amendments 
for this term were only applicable to the future presidents.71 Even with reforms 
strengthening the powers of the legislature and fundamental rights of citizens, 
the executive president remains powerful.72  
Former Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa similarly amended 
the constitution removing the term limits on presidency and also strengthening 
president’s powers to make appointments to the judiciary and the independent 
commissions.73 However, the most recent Nineteenth Amendment to the 1978 
Constitution reintroduced the presidential term limits. Therefore, in South 
Korea and Sri Lanka the practices of abusive constitutionalism have been 
averted to an extent even though the executive presidency remains powerful. 
Nevertheless, the attempts at constitutional restraints have aided people’s 
movements to succeed as they have cut short the full-fledged presidential 
powers. 
On the other hand, Venezuelan and Algerian abusive constitutionalism 
mechanisms remain in place without being countered. Venezuela removed 
 
68  Id. 
69  Constitutional History of South Korea, supra note 47. 
70  EDWARD M. GRAHAM, REFORMING KOREA’S INDUSTRIAL CONGLOMERATES 26 (2003). 
71  Constitutional History of South Korea, supra note 47. 
72  Id. 
73  Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Eighteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution (Sept. 9, 2010), https://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitution/18th_amendment_act.pdf; 
Gehan Gunatilleke, A Review of ‘The Eighteeth Amendment to the Constitution: Substance and Process, 
GROUNDVIEWS (Sept. 26, 2011, https://groundviews.org/2011/09/26/a-review-of-%E2%80%98the-
eighteenth-amendment-to-the-constitution-substance-and-process%E2%80%99/). 
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term limits on all elected officials in 2009 through passing a referendum.74 
Even though the referendum reflects the voices of people, and thus a tool of 
democracy, Venezuelan government was accused of stifling the opposition in 
their campaign towards the referendum.75 Therefore, abusive constitutional 
amendment in this instance gained the sanction of people through 
manipulation of state resources. Algeria also removed presidential term limits 
by an amendment to its constitution in 2008.76 Bouteflika was accused of 
election fraud, just as Maduro, and Bouteflika also governed the country 
through emergency until the pressure of 2011 Arab Spring.77  
These constitutional amendments and misuse of constitutional 
provisions have not only weakened or silenced opposition, but have also 
debilitated the freedom, political participation and choice of the people. When 
the people have less effective participation afforded through the constitutional 
text, people are compelled to find other avenues to pressure the governing 
elites.78  
C. Weak or Actively Suppressed Political Opposition  
South Korea and Sri Lanka have moved from active repression of 
political parties to a context where the parties are struggling to establish an 
identity and retain a voter base in a volatile environment of polarization. Both 
countries struggle with the issue whereby parties represent a leader rather than 
an ideology and thereby, there is no political loyalty towards the party.79 
Whereas ideological coherence in the parties is established with the risk of 
polarization, lack of ideology weakens the party organization power and voter 
 
74  Constitutional History of Venezuela, supra note 56 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
75  Rory Carroll, Hugo Chavez Wins Referendum Allowing Indefinite Re-election, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
16, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/16/hugo-chavez-indefinite-rule). 
76  Constitutional History of Algeria, CONSTITUTIONNET (2016), 
http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-algeria. 
77  See Algeria: Constitution, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/algeria-
constitution (2019). 
78  See Donatella Della Porta, Communication in Movement: Social Movements as Agents of 
Participatory Democracy, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: INNOVATIONS IN PARTICIPATORY POLITICS 
39, 39–40 (Brian D. Loader & Dan Mercea eds., 2012). 
79  See generally David I. Steinberg & Myung Shin, Tensions in South Korean Political Parties in 
Transition: From Entourage to Ideology? 46 ASIAN SURVEY 518 (2006); Frank Ching, In Korea, No Party 
Loyalty, 163 FAR E. ECONOMIC REV. 34 (2000); Hoon Jaung, The Historical Origins of Frail Party Politics 
in South Korea: The Abortive Experiment of Democratic Republican Party, 1963-1979, 10 KOREAN 
PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 313–346 (2015). 
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mobilization. When the parties are unable to represent the voters ideologically, 
their legitimacy to bring about change wanes.  
Suppression of opposition parties was prominent in South Korea under 
the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee.80 However, the country has had a plethora 
of political parties since its transition to democracy in 1987.81 Nevertheless, 
politicians’ ties to political parties are thin and parties frequently fracture over 
disagreements or reorganize themselves under different names and party 
colors.82 Intra-party fighting is complicated further by illicit inter-party fights. 
In 2017, the National Intelligence Service of South Korea revealed that its 
previous officials “mobilized cyberwarfare experts” to carry out an internet 
campaign that would swing the voters in favor of Park Geun-hye over her rival 
Moon Jae-In in the 2012 presidential election.83 Sri Lankan opposition was 
weak during Rajapaksa presidency because he enticed the opposition 
parliamentarians to join the government. Rajapaksa’s regime was toppled only 
because his minister of health and general secretary of the party, Sirisena 
defected from his party and became the opposition’s candidate. Opposition 
parties built a coalition to defeat Rajapaksa and therefore, in 2018 political 
parties were comparatively more autonomous to pick their alliances.  
In a context of ideologically weak political parties, people’s movements 
are a routine mechanism for the people to express their concerns with 
governance.84 Nevertheless, the presence of a strong political opposition 
within the South Korean and Sri Lankan legislatures, free to express dissent 
within the state structure, has become a channel through which people’s 
movements could assert constitutional principles. But at the same time, these 
parties in the opposition are less interested in reforming the existing power 
structures to entrench constitutional principles. They are more focused on 
grabbing power within the same tilted frameworks, rather than effective 
 
80  See Hancocks, supra note 5; Jaung, supra note 79, at 9.  
81  See Steinberg & Shin, supra note 79; Ching, supra note 79. 
82  See Jin Kai, Why Are South Korean Politics so Messy?, THE DIPLOMAT (May 26, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/why-are-south-korean-politics-so-messy/; Korea – Political Parties, 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/politics-parties.htm (last updated 
2019). 
83  See Justin McCurry, South Korea Spy Agency Admits Trying to Rig 2012 Presidential Election, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:15 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/04/south-koreas-spy-
agency-admits-trying-rig-election-national-intelligence-service-2012. 
84  See Sunhyuk Kim, “Contentious Democracy” in South Korea, An Active Civil Society and 
Ineffectual Political Parties, 8 TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 51, 55–56 (2012). 
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entrenchment of constitutional principles through impartial constitutional 
reform. 
On the other hand, in Venezuela and Algeria, where the opposing parties 
are actively suppressed and are denied effective powers, people’s movements 
have had a harder time to move the government to listen to their demands. 
While weak institutionalization of parties is a structural issue of Venezuelan 
politics,85 Venezuela’s president has been ruthlessly suppressing political 
dissent while struggling to maintain the country’s economic stability in the 
face of falling oil prices.86 Opposition leaders such as Leopoldo Lopez and 
Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma have been either in jail or house arrest for 
prolonged periods.87 Guaidó himself is facing travel bans and threats of 
arrest.88  
Algeria’s major opposition party, Islamic Salvation Front was banned 
at the introduction of the multiparty system by Article 178(2) of the 1996 
Constitution after a political monopoly of Front de Libération Nationale under 
the constitution of 1963.89 The constitution also prohibits parties based on 
“religious, linguistic, racial, sexual, corporatist or regional basis” under 
Article 42.90 Therefore, opposition parties and political dissent is actively 
suppressed in Algerian context.  
 
85  See Daniel Hellinger, The Second Wave of Incorporation and Political Parties in the Venezuelan 
Petrostate, in RESHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA IN LATIN AMERICA 251–52 (Eduardo Silva & Federico 
Rossi eds., 2018). 
86  See Zeeshan Aleem, How Venezuela Went from a Rich Democracy to a Dictatorship on the Brink 
of Collapse, VOX (Sep. 19, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/16189742/venezuela-
maduro-dictator-chavez-collapse; Scott Neuman, Venezuelan Agents Arrest Opposition Leaders in Midnight 
Raids, NPR (Aug. 1, 2017, 9:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/08/01/540790886/venezuela-agents-arrest-opposition-leaders-in-midnight-raids. 
87  Neuman, supra note 86. 
88  See Opposition Leader Barred from Leaving Venezuela, CBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019, 7:20 PM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/venezuela-guaido-barred-leaving-supreme-court-1.4998072. 
89  Algeria: Constitution, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/ 
humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/algeria-constitution (2019). 
90  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA 1963, art. 42 (“The right 
to establish political parties is recognized and guaranteed. However, this right cannot be used to violate the 
fundamental liberties, the fundamental values and components of the national identity, the national unity, the 
security and integrity of the national territory, the independence of the country and the People’s sovereignty 
as well as against the democratic and republican nature of the State. In respect to the provisions of the present 
Constitution, the political parties cannot be founded on religious, linguistic, racial, sex, corporatist or regional 
basis.”) 
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IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENTS   
People’s movements are taking place in a backdrop of weak or 
unresponsive state structure. Therefore, the first characteristic of these 
movements relates to the historical experience of authoritarianism against 
which the citizens are propelled to act.  The second characteristic of these 
people’s movements is the substantive value basis of constitutional principles 
upon which the citizens have united to protest against the state and demand 
change. This is crucial in a context where citizens are denied elections, well-
organized political parties, and freedom of expression, and press to play their 
role in constitutional governance. The third is the use of technology as a means 
of amplifying citizen voices. While people have protested against abuse of 
power time and again, and have been ruthlessly suppressed by the oppressive 
regimes, technological advances make it increasingly harder to silence public 
dissent.  
A. Driven by Abhorrence Towards Authoritarianism and Corruption    
These countries are either in the grips of an authoritarian leader or 
memory of authoritarianism is painfully fresh in their memories.91 South 
Korea had moved from the dictatorial regimes of Rhee Syngman and Park 
Chung Hee to a democratic model through public pressure in the 1980s.92 Park 
Chung Hee led Korea to economic prosperity through implementing the 
developmental state model.93 This model consists of export-led growth 
strategies and government support of national industry champions, alongside 
stringent state regulation of civil and political rights including any form of 
political dissent or disruption.94 Following the assassination of Park Chung 
Hee, South Korea was effectively ruled by Chun Doo Hwan, who gained 
control of the military through a coup and imposed martial law.95 However, in 
May 1980 during the Kwangju uprising, the suppressed university students 
led protests against the authoritarian regime.96 Despite this uprising being 
 
91  See Larry Diamond, supra note 66. See generally Yascha Mounk, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: 
WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER AND HOW TO SAVE IT (2018); DANIEL ZIBLATT & STEVEN LEVITSKY, 
HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018). 
92  Constitutional History of South Korea, supra note 47. 
93  GRAHAM, supra note 70. 
94  Id. 
95  Chong-suk Han, Kwangju Uprising: South Korean History, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2007), 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Kwangju-Uprising. 
96  Id. 
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ruthlessly crushed by the military, South Koreans consider this uprising as a 
catalyst towards bringing about democracy.97 Chun’s chosen successor, Roh 
Tae Woo amended the constitution allowing the people to directly elect the 
president and South Korea has had democratically elected presidents ever 
since.98 
Sri Lanka was just emerging from the civil war, the end of which was 
marked by a soft authoritarian regime of a strong executive president.99  
Rajapaksa’s regime was infamous for violation of human rights and political 
freedoms, suppression of political dissent and a rhetoric of radical Sinhala 
nationalism, which was harmful towards the liberties of the minorities.100 
Three decades of civil war also justified and systematized rule by emergency, 
militarization and surveillance of the public as well as human rights violations 
for the sake national security.101 However, people were getting increasingly 
frustrated when these conditions did not undergo substantial transformations 
after the much-celebrated end of the civil war.102 The country had transitioned 
into a more liberal, human rights-oriented regime through the Presidential and 
parliamentary elections of 2015.103 Nevertheless, some of the systemic 
drawbacks continue to hinder the flourishing of constitutional democracy in 
Sri Lanka and therefore, people continue to agitate for reform.  
Venezuela has been captured by different dictators throughout its post-
independence period. Democratic leaders have only lasted a short period 
 
97  Id. 
98  Id.  
99  See Jayadeva Uyangoda, Rebuilding Institutions in the Transition from Soft Authoritarianism, THE 
ISLAND (Feb 09, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-
details&code_title=119250 (“The defining feature of soft authoritarianism as a regime model is the shift to 
authoritarianism while democratic elections and institutions such as parliament are still functioning and the 
rulers still seek political legitimacy through the electoral process. Manipulation of the electoral process, 
undermining of democratic institutions frontal attacks on the rival opposition parties as well as democratic 
civil society, and the promotion of the personality cult of the leader are usual practices under soft 
authoritarianism.”); Neil DeVotta, From Civil War to Soft Authoritarianism: Sri Lanka in Comparative 
Perspective in GLOBAL CHANGE PEACE & SECURITY 331, 333 (2010). 
100  See Profile: Mahinda Rajapaksa, BBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/G95G-VPER.  
101  See generally Radhika Coomaraswamy & Charmaine de los Reyes, Rule by Emergency: Sri Lanka’s 
Postcolonial Constitutional Experience, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 272 (2014); Sri Lanka: Failed Pledges Mar 10 
Years Since War’s End, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 17, 2019, 10:15 PM EDT), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/17/sri-lanka-failed-pledges-mar-10-years-wars-end. 
102  Neil DeVotta & Sumit Ganguly, The Scarring of Democracy in Sri Lanka, US NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018, 
11:09 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-11-08/commentary-sri-lankas-
constitutional-crisis-and-the-threat-to-its-democracy. 
103  Id. 
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before they were ousted by military or popular uprisings.104 The 1996 
constitution was promulgated by Hugo Chávez, who was democratically 
elected in 1998. However, this constitution failed to draft a governance 
mechanism that would prevent rise of dictatorships in future. His successor, 
Maduro, has effectively become a democratic authoritarian who has 
suppressed the political opposition, judicial independence and freedom of 
press.105 He wields complete control over the government and military, but he 
has failed to improve economic and social conditions of the people.106  
Middle Eastern countries who went through the Arab Spring were also 
still under dictatorships: Tunisia under the power of President Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak and Libya under the power of Muammar 
Gaddafi.107 These presidents abused their power in a manner that entrenched 
their power and wealth at the expense of general public. As a result, the public 
faced social and economic disempowerment and the pent-up frustrations were 
a main reason which triggered the Arab Springs of 2011.108 Bouteflika of 
Algeria lifted the state of emergency by which he ruled the country for 
nineteen years and promised further constitutional reform in order prevent the 
uprisings in 2011.109 However, the people have not seen any meaningful 
reform and meanwhile their octogenarian president became an outright puppet 
for the corrupt elite after suffering a stroke in 2013.110  His written 
announcement of his candidacy to run for a fifth term of presidency provoked 
immediate protests, and this was a response arising from a prolonged and 
persistent experience of authoritarianism.111 Therefore, painful memories of 
authoritarianism, or the deteriorating conditions of life brought about by 
 
104  See Constitutional History of Venezuela, supra note 56. 
105  Aleem, supra note 86. 
106  Id. 
107  See BROWNLEE ET AL., supra note 43; Haas et al., supra note 43. 
108  Abdul QadirMushtaq & Muhammad Afzal, Arab Spring: Its Causes and Consequences, 30 J. 
PUNJAB U. HISTORICAL SOC’Y 1, 1–3 (Jan.–June 2017), 
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/HistoryPStudies/PDF_Files/01_V-30-No1-Jun17.pdf 
109  See Algeria Lifts 19-Year-Old State of Emergency, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2011, 12:23 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-emergency-lifting/algeria-lifts-19-year-old-state-of-emergency-
idUSTRE71N6VS20110224. 
110  See Rana Jaward, How Does Reclusive President Bouteflika Run Algeria?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47456114.  
111  See Ruth Michaelson, Bouteflika to Quit as Algeria’s President After Huge Protests, THE GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 1, 2019, 12:47 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/01/algerias-president-abdelaziz-
bouteflika-to-step-down-by-28-april. 
360 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 2 
 
authoritarian regimes, allowed the people to put down their differences, at 
least temporarily, to unite against a common threat to their wellbeing.  
Furthermore, presidential or semi-presidential systems of these 
countries constitutionally allow for a powerful individual to enjoy a vast 
amount of unchecked discretion. This has paved way for authoritarianism 
which sanctions and perpetuates corruption of the ruling elite. Impunity for 
corruption compels the citizens to mobilize in response to demand 
accountability. The South Korean Candlelight Protests were triggered by the 
corrupt practices of Park and her advisors in collusion with the 
conglomerates.112 Sri Lanka’s previous president’s regime was widely 
accused of corruption and embezzlement of state finances and his sudden 
power grab through precarious constitutional means was allegedly to shield 
his brother who was to face trial for misuse of state finances.113 Venezuelan 
democracy has a long history of corruption,114 and Maduro has continued that 
history. His sanction of corrupt military has resulted in their continued support 
for his regime.115 The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project 
picked Maduro as the 2016 “man of the year in organized crime and 
corruption” for misuse of state finances, repression of political opposition and 
press, and allowing his family members to deal in drugs.116 While Bouteflika 
failed to curb the state-wide corruption, which resulted in Algeria sinking in 
Transparency International’s corruption perception index,117 2019 anti-
corruption crackdowns led to the apprehension of his close associates for 
engaging in corrupt practices.118  When the state mechanisms are failing to 
 
112  Presidential Scandal, supra note 3. 
113  See Tisaranee Gunasekara, Deranged, COLOMBO TELEGRAPH (Nov. 11, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/S3NM-MWFA. 
114  See Gustavo Coronel, The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela, CATO INSTITUTE (Mar. 4, 2008), 
https://www.cato.org/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela. 
115  See Venezuela Crisis: Why the Military is Backing Maduro, BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47036129. 
116  See Person of the Year 2016: Nicolás Maduro, ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION REPORTING 
PROJECT (last visited Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.occrp.org/en/poy/2016/.  
117  See Ahmed Marwane, Fighting Corruption in Algeria: Turning Words into Action, FIKRA FORUM 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/fighting-corruption-in-algeria-
turning-words-into-action. 
118  See Algeria: 5 Billionaires Arrested as Part of Anti-Corruption Drive, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/algeria-5-billionaires-arrested-part-anti-corruption-drive-
190422111903777.html. 
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check the executive from corruption, people have no choice but to directly 
challenge the representative to whom they conferred powers.119  
B. Constitutional Principles as the Rallying Point   
Democracy and rule of law were the central rallying point of all these 
protests. When the institutional checks fail at holding the elected 
representatives accountable, people have had to directly assemble themselves 
and demand the upholding of constitutional principles. South Korean 
protestors were seeking accountability for the corruption of the president and 
the most senior advisors of the government.120 The people’s movements rallied 
around the constitutional principle of people’s sovereignty.121 They insisted 
that the president derived her authority from the people and that people will 
not tolerate such lack of accountability and transparency in presidential 
conduct.122  
Similarly, Sri Lankan protesters explicitly claimed that they were not 
supporting a person but defending the salient principles of their constitutional 
democracy.123 They emphasized the sovereignty of people and the importance 
of protecting democracy.124 People, protesting in Colombo, called for the 
officials ranging from the president, speaker and parliamentarians to the 
Election Commissioners and the judges to uphold the constitution.125 When 
the president dissolved the parliament in violation of the constitution, he tried 
to veil the violation by stating that parliamentary elections promote people’s 
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sovereignty because then the people can exercise their sovereignty directly 
through franchise as stated in Article 3 and 4 of the constitution. However, 
people petitioned that elections held in violation of the constitution cannot be 
free and fair.126 Therefore, the people’s movement was firmly grounded on 
constitutional doctrine.  
Even Venezuela, where citizen protests began with their National State 
Assembly president, Juan Guaidó, stepping up to challenge the president, 
protests demanded democracy. Protestors carried Venezuelan flags and 
banners supporting democracy as well as remembrances of those who had 
fallen in the struggle.127 The initial protest took place on the Venezuelan Youth 
Day, commemorating the Battle of La Victoria in 1814 during Venezuela’s 
war for independence where many young people died for the country—a 
significant day to remind the role that people, especially the younger 
generations, play in shaping the country’s destiny.128 
Algerian protestors emphasized the republican nature of their country 
in demanding their president to quit.129 Given the recurrent failure of politics 
to govern in the public interest, people mobilize themselves to demand 
accountability from the state and its officials. The protestors initially 
demanded that Bouteflika step down, with chanting, “the people want to pave 
the way.”130 However, demands of the movement evolved once it became clear 
that meaningful constitutional democracy was not possible under the current 
regime and without resignation of the president and other power players.131 
The people then called for the fall of the regime.132 Rejecting the procedural 
constitutional provisions which state that presidential elections should be held 
within ninety days of the resignation of the incumbent, people cited Articles 
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6, 7, and 8 on the sovereignty of people as paramount.133 Therefore, the 
Algerian people’s movements have moved beyond the text of the constitution 
that restrict constitutional principles in practice. 
C. Technology as the Method of Mobilization   
Given the tendency of repressive regimes to capture, repress, or distort 
mass media,134 alternative methods of disseminating information are crucial. 
Technological advances provide a variety of different platforms of 
information sharing, communication, and debate, such as social media, 
messaging apps, blogs, and e-news websites. These platforms allow people to 
express their dissent online as well as mobilize for other forms of political 
participation such as holding marches and protests as well as attending 
political debates and signing petitions.135 Social media has the potential 
advantage of disrupting the top-down nature of information sharing and also 
attempting to equalize the field in terms opportunities to access and 
disseminate information.136  
South Korea’s major television channels and newspapers were found to 
be biased towards coverage of the political agenda of the incumbent 
president.137 Therefore, it is hard for political dissent to rely on mainstream 
media. Mobilization of people for South Korea’s Candlelight Protests took 
place through social media and citizens reported the progress of protests 
through their smartphones. People participated in the progress of the protests 
through sharing information through the Korean chat, Kakao Talk, as well as 
Facebook and other social media.138 
 
133  Id. 
134  See Sarah Repucci, Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral (last accessed 
Mar. 11, 2020).  
135  See Mahmood Monshipouri, Introduction: Protests and Human Rights in Context, in INFORMATION 
POLITICS, PROTESTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 6 (Mahmood Monshipouri ed., 2016); 
Sangwon Lee, The Role of Social Media in Protest Participation: The Case of Candlelight Vigils in South 
Korea 12 INT’L J. COMM. 1523, 1524–25 (2018). 
136  See SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: INNOVATIONS IN PARTICIPATORY POLITICS 8 (Brian D. 
Loader & Dan Mercea eds., Routledge 2012).  
137  See Chang Sup Park, Korean Media Often Allied with Ruling Political Parties, 36 NEWSPAPER RES. 
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In Sri Lanka, one of the early steps of the constitutional coup was for 
the new Prime Minister’s side to take over the mainstream media.139 While 
this signaled the repression that was about to follow, it also meant that 
dissemination of information, as well as citizen activism, could only take 
place through the internet. There were threats to shut down the internet as 
well, which indeed was a measure taken during ethnic tensions between 
Sinhalese and Muslims in March 2018,140 and also in the aftermath of Easter 
Sunday Attacks of April 2019.141 However, this did not happen during the 
constitutional coup, arguably because president was publicly proclaiming to 
act in the name of democracy and rule of law. Thus, internet-based activism 
and mobilization were crucial for rallying against the president.  
The leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly has been 
communicating with the public through social media.142 Similar to other 
contexts, mainstream media are under the tight control of the government. 
However, Guaidó summoned hundreds of thousands of people to the streets 
for non-violent demonstrations through social media.143 The people were 
asked to convey their grievances through placards and they referred to 
fundamental issues of lack of food, access to medicine and crippled quality of 
life.144 Social media remains the only avenue through which the people can 
comprehend what is happening around them and also communicate to the 
world the gravity of the situation that they are facing in their country and the 
suffering that they are undergoing.145 Nevertheless, the regime has made 
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several attempts to restrict social media activism through blackouts and 
crackdown of activists.146 
During the Arab Spring, masses of people were educated through 
internet-based sources and were mobilized through social media.147 In fact, 
Arab Springs, which spread through Middle Eastern countries, were also 
known as Facebook revolutions, Twitter revolutions or social media 
revolutions.148 Algerian protestors are similarly mobilizing social media and 
internet platforms to mobilize the people and also report the progress of the 
rallies through Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.149 People’s uprisings were 
spearheaded by the youth organization Active Youth Collective, which began 
its activism through Facebook.150 Social media also becomes the avenue for 
the younger generations to see the international and regional developments 
and lack of progress in the domestic social, economic sphere.151 Both in Sri 
Lanka and Algeria, people have lost their trust in the mainstream media, which 
have been muzzled by the government.152 Algerian protests have triggered the 
journalists themselves to mobilize against repression of their freedom of 
expression to engage in independent journalism.153 While the Algerian 
government has engaged in blackouts, they have not blocked social media or 
internet, and there have been no arrests of the social media activists.154 
Protestors have also understood that disciplined protests are the most 
effective. Thereby, Algerian social media pages instructed the protestors to 
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“come equipped only with ‘love, faith, Algerian flags and roses’, and to take 
litter away with them.”155 
V. PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS AS A DISTINCT STAND OF POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM  
This section distinguishes and conceptualizes people’s movements 
analyzed above as a distinct strand of popular constitutionalism. The first part 
of the section discusses the U.S. based conceptualization of popular 
constitutionalism which argues that people’s representatives should receive 
priority in authority to uphold the constitution. The second section 
distinguishes people’s movements asserting constitutional principles from 
social movements that advocate for social and political causes generally. The 
following section distinguishes people’s movements as a phenomenon that 
precedes constitutional moments, during which constitutional reforms take 
place. Based on these arguments, people’s movements asserting constitutional 
principles are placed as a strand of popular constitutionalism that pits people 
against people’s agents. This is different from the U.S. based 
conceptualization because it operates on the assumption that mechanisms of 
constitutional governance ensure that people’s agents uphold people’s will. 
However, people’s movements occur when the country’s governance 
mechanisms fail to ensure that people’s agents represent their will. A 
constitutional moment could be a potential outcome of people’s movements, 
but they occur prior to a constitutional moment. 
A. U.S.-Based Conceptualization of Popular Constitutionalism  
The concept of popular constitutionalism encourages people to be 
actively involved in interpretation and implementation of the constitution. The 
proponents for popular constitutionalism have based their arguments on the 
constitutional law of the United States. They have emphasized the tension 
between constitutional interpretation by elected branches of the state versus 
the un-elected judiciary. Larry Kramer, former Professor of Law at Stanford 
Law School, in People Themselves, illustrates the nature of the United States 
Constitution as a compact of the people and how the agents of the people were 
entrusted with implementing the constitution.156 Kramer argues that “to define 
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a role for courts have been part of a larger and more fundamental struggle to 
maintain the authority of ordinary citizens over their Constitution.” 157 Kramer 
disagrees with the dichotomy that politics are within the realm of the ordinary 
people and that the constitution, by virtue of being a law, is under the 
guardianship of the judges. He challenges the Cooper v. Aaron158 reading of 
Marbury v. Madison159 that if it is the province of the court to state what the 
law is and what the constitution is, then the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the constitution is supreme.   
Popular constitutionalists range from those who denounce judicial 
supremacy to radicals who denounce judicial review itself.160 However, the 
United States-oriented popular constitutionalism functions upon the backdrop 
of people having designed the constitution and plays a role in constitutional 
governance “at least in some limited sense—through elections, social 
movements, and judicial nominations.”161 Therefore, Tom Donnelly, who was 
a Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School, concludes 
that “even under our current system, constitutional doctrine tends to track 
public opinion in most high-salience areas.”162  Thus, the main claim of 
popular constitutionalism is that “the American people––or, at least, their 
elected representatives––must have a direct means of enforcing popular 
constitutional understandings” because “for popular constitutionalists . . . the 
invisible hand of public opinion is not enough.”163 
But the countries in focus in this paper face a fundamental issue 
whereby the people are either precluded from electing their representatives 
through free and fair periodic elections or their elected representatives no 
longer represent their interests. Consequently, the fundamental assumption of 
people’s representatives aligning with the will of the people, taken for granted 
by the current conceptualization of popular constitutionalism, is absent in 
these countries. Therefore, the people’s movements are attempting to either 
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transform the basic constitutional structures to be more democratic or ensure 
that representatives in power are accountable to the constitutional norms.  
B. People’s Movements Distinguished from Socio-Political Movements 
 Corey Brettschneider, Professor of Political Science at Brown 
University, reviewing UC Santa Cruz University Associate Professor 
Elizabeth Beaumont’s The Civic Constitution: Civic Visions and Struggles in 
the Path toward Constitutional Democracy, highlights the significance of 
defining the people engaged in popular constitutionalism and whether the 
nature of their demands are in fact constitutional.164  However, focusing upon 
the United States, Beaumont deals with people’s engagement via the socio-
political movements.165 This differs from people’s movements discussed here 
because such movements operate within the existing framework of 
governance in the country.166 They are a strand of citizen activism that Duncan 
Green, Professor in Practice at London School of Economics, defines broadly 
as “any individual action with social consequences, and much of it involves 
collective activity, including participation in faith groups or neighborhood 
associations, producer organizations and trade unions, village savings and 
loan groups, and funeral societies, among others.”167  
Beaumont focuses on political activism of citizens within this broad 
definition to distinguish the movements which qualify as popular 
constitutionalism. Examples provided are movements advocating for African 
Americans’ rights and women's rights, which are movements to win rights of 
different groups of people within the existing political and constitutional 
structure through negotiations with its existing powerholders.168 Such is 
possible when the people’s agents are responsive towards people’s demands. 
However, the primary purpose of a constitutional movement is to dismantle 
the power players of the current political and constitutional structure, which 
does not provide any mechanism to hold them accountable to the people. 
Therefore, a social movement becomes a constitutional movement when 
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people base their substantive demands on democracy and rule of law and 
mobilize to challenge the existing structures of governance. The difference is 
in the substantive demands and goals of the movement. 
C. People’s Constitutional Movements Distinguished from Constitutional 
Moments 
Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at 
Yale Law School, in We the People: Foundations, introduces a four-stage 
process of higher lawmaking, whereby the constitutional transformations 
happen through “signaling, proposing, deliberating and codifying 
functions.”169 Ackerman’s analysis triggered an array of constitutional 
literature critiquing “both its descriptive accuracy and normative 
desirability.”170 However, the focus of Ackerman’s theory is to justify the 
constitutional changes that are premised on precarious legal grounds 
according to the existing constitutional structure.171 Ackerman purports that 
people pronounce their will in exceptional instances of so-called 
constitutional moments, during which higher law making, i.e., constitutional 
reform takes place, thus giving rise to a dualist democracy. However, the 
starkness of the distinction between ordinary politics and constitutional 
moments is questionable,172 especially in the United States where the 
procedure to amend the constitution is extremely rigid and unwritten 
constitutional practices of the three branches of the state constitute a 
significant portion of country’s governance. But the United States is once 
again in a special position in this regard because the countries analyzed in this 
paper have relatively detailed written constitutions with more flexible 
amendment procedures. Therefore, rather than identifying constitutional 
moments, focus in other countries is upon the amending and replacing the 
constitutions procedurally and substantively complying with constitutional 
principles.173 
However, the focus of this paper is at a process prior to this so-called 
higher law-making process. Ackerman’s higher law-making phase might 
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arrive as an outcome of the constitutional movement, as was seen in Tunisia 
during the Arab Springs of 2011.174 But this is not the guaranteed result as 
seen in the South Korean and Sri Lankan examples. These movements indeed 
transformed political regimes of the country, but the people’s constitutional 
movements in the above instances acted as a check against the powerholders 
of the regime by holding them accountable to the constitutional principles of 
their existing constitutional regime. Higher lawmaking is not necessarily their 
only goal or the paramount goal, even when the people do see the weaknesses 
of their current constitutional structure.  
The initial phase of signaling is when “the movement earns the 
constitutional authority to claim that, in contrast to the countless ideological 
fractions competing in normal politics, its reform agenda should be placed at 
the center of sustained public scrutiny.”175 However, in people’s constitutional 
movements, the people are challenging the existing regime that is oppressive 
and corrupt and does not abide by the constitutional rules that are said to 
govern them. People are demanding that the ruling elites conform to the most 
basic constitutional principles, which are confined to the written text in these 
contexts. Therefore, the political responsibility is minimal in this context and 
people are compelled to pressurize their governments for reform. Even though 
opposition politicians have given leadership to the people’s movements, as 
seen in Venezuela, individual leadership has not been the focal point but the 
collective effort of the people.176 
Ackerman theorizes that in the second phase of higher lawmaking the 
movement is encouraged to “focus its rhetoric into a series of more or less 
operational proposals for constitutional reform.”177 At the third phase of 
“mobilized popular deliberation,” Ackerman refers to the backlash produced 
by the previously silent stakeholders against imminent change and illustrates 
how tough it is for the reform proposals to withstand this backlash.178 People’s 
movements in discussion also need to face backlash by those who have a 
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vested regime in the existing system. Only the backlash would be stronger 
because those with a vested interest have distorted the constitutional systems 
to their advantage to such an extent that they are virtually omnipotent. This 
was especially evident in the Venezuelan and Algerian examples.179 Therefore, 
even when people are legally the authority of all state power in terms of the 
constitutional theory, people themselves have to muster immense courage at 
immense costs to their lives and liberties to ensure that their rulers abide by 
the most basic constitutional principles.  
D. People’s Constitutional Movements as People Versus People’s Agents 
People’s movements to assert constitutional principles are a special 
type of movement that challenges the rules and the practices of a constitutional 
and political structure which are unconstitutional in principle. In 
constitutional theory, people evaluate their candidates through fair and free 
periodic elections, referendums and through other institutional mechanisms. 
However, as the presidential or semi-presidential systems allow one or few 
individuals to weaken these constitutional procedures of checks and balances, 
people are compelled to mobilize themselves to act directly as a check against 
their representatives.  
Generally, people are not a monolith and speak in many voices. Even 
during the people’s movements discussed, in Sri Lanka and Venezuela there 
were counter-movements supporting the establishment even though they have 
been comparatively weak or staged. Moreover, ethnically heterogeneous Sri 
Lankan society is experiencing simultaneous division based on ethnicity, 
rising to the forefront in the aftermath of Easter Sunday Attacks, April 2019. 
Nevertheless, Sri Lankan society, politically deeply divided in terms of 
ethnicity since British colonial era, carried out a relatively cohesive 
constitutional movement against presidential abuse of power in 2018. This 
movement was just as forceful as the Candlelight Protests of South Korea, 
where the society is relatively homogenous. In Algerian and Venezuelan 
societies, the constitutional movements were led by the youth bulge, 
disillusioned and frustrated with the depravation of avenues for progress. 
However, the aging population of South Korea led a similarly successful 
constitutional movement against their president. Therefore, such diverse 
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entities are driven to unity (although not perfect) in this specific instance, 
because the constitutional and political environment of the country results in 
scathing failure to advance public interests. 
Even though the governments have resorted to disproportionately 
effective mechanisms to suppress people’s movements, from cyber blockades 
to military power, people have persevered. Technology has provided them 
with unprecedented means to persist in their dissent.180 Intellect, discipline 
and peacefulness of the protests, which are firmly grounded on constitutional 
principles, have been a significant character of these people’s movements. 
Therefore, these movements are a special instance of popular 
constitutionalism, in response to a gap in a particular constitutional structure 
that allows for abusive of power by the executive.  
VI. DILEMMAS FACED BY PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENTS  
Firstly, that advances of technology provide citizens more opportunity 
to access information, express themselves and mobilize themselves against 
the tyrannical rulers. Secondly, that success of citizen movements depends on 
their ability to influence the legislature, executive and judiciary to formally 
concede to and effectuate their views. Thirdly, this collision between the 
citizens and the state apparatus has dangers of destabilizing the country or 
alternatively, weakening the citizens’ call to uphold principles of 
constitutional law through their integration into the current inefficient state 
apparatus.   
A. Citizen Mobilization from Social Media to Streets  
Constitutionalism envisages a limited form of government through 
separation of powers and protection of fundamental rights. The traditional 
conception of constitutionalism focuses upon the institutional mechanisms to 
deliver its goals. People become a formidable collective check against the 
governmental abuses of power through people’s movements. Technology acts 
as a springboard to facilitate and amplify such activism. Dissemination of 
information, mobilization of protestors and advertisement of protests’ 
progress take place through social media.   
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The significance of these methods is in that they disrupt the top-down 
nature of traditional media and monopoly over the news.181 In the countries 
discussed, state media are subject to capture and heavy regulation by the 
government in power. Therefore, mainstream media only deliver a biased and 
incomplete narrative. Hence, there is a need for this gap to be filled by 
multiple actors who get the opportunity to share a multitude of information 
and news through internet-based mechanisms. Consequently, in each of these 
countries, social media activism has been a springboard in disrupting state-led 
narratives and emboldening citizens to express dissent.182 Furthermore, social 
media was the method of calling people out for street protests, especially as 
traditional media get heavily regulated through authoritarianism.183  
South Koreans used creative methods of protests, from candle lights to 
slogans demanding accountability.184 During the Christmas season, the 
protestors dressed up in Santa suits.28 Progress of the movement was shared 
by people themselves. This is effective because the mainstream media has lost 
its credibility to engage in unbiased and accurate journalism. During the Sri 
Lankan Constitutional Coup in 2018, street protests, social media activism, 
and petitions complemented and amplified the effects of each other in 
expressing people's dissent. Protest slogans and social media posts ranged 
from sharing of scholarly writings and latest news updates to memes and 
cartoons. Petitions were addressed directly to the President, challenging his 
acts and calling him to act in accordance with the constitutional norms.185   
Language, slogans, and art played a significant role in the Arab Spring 
as people used powerful phrases, flags, paint and graffiti to express their 
dissent.186 Venezuelan and Algerian people were also seen carrying the flags 
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and posters demanding for democracy.187 Progress of these street protests was 
shared globally through internet-based mechanisms. Therefore, technology 
acts as a means for the citizens to express themselves domestically as well as 
to the international community in order to amplify the vigor of their demands 
for constitutional governance.  
Technology provides citizens a method of mobilization which is 
physically safer, even though movements in South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Venezuela and Algeria have all progressed into street protests. Protests in 
South Korea and Sri Lanka were peaceful.188 Protestors in Venezuela and 
Algeria resorted to violence only after the actions that were taken by 
governments to repress them. The Venezuelan state engaged in extrajudicial 
execution of those who protested via social media posts, highlighting the 
extent of repression capable by an authoritarian regime.189 Nevertheless, the 
movements show that the people can mobilize in peaceful, intellectual 
revolutions to uphold constitutionalism and furthermore, their capacity to 
voice these constitutional principles in their own terms. This is the potential 
of the people’s movements in promoting constitutionalism.   
However, the limitation of reliance on Internet-based mechanisms for 
such activism is the extent of its outreach. For instance, internet usage among 
the Sri Lankan population was just 33%, and 49.2% in Algeria in 2018.190 60% 
of the Venezuelan population was using internet in 2017.191 This limitation 
creates a significant disparity in the availability of information for the citizens 
based on their technology literacy and thus leaves out a significant population 
from the discourse. In contrast, in South Korea, virtually every household had 
internet facilities by 2017,192 and the percentage of internet using population 
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was 89.9% by 2016.193 However, internet usage itself does not guarantee 
social media activeness and online political participation.194 Therefore, there 
is a high risk that economically and educationally marginalized communities 
are denied political participation with use of internet-based mechanisms as the 
main means of activism.  
Furthermore, the government could censor internet usage and social 
media to inhibit citizen activism; China habitually uses this tactic, and Sri 
Lanka has temporarily resorted to it several times. The Venezuelan 
government has been blocking social media platforms such as Instagram and 
domestically popular websites to keep the citizens ignorant.195 Guaidó has 
faced significant challenges in reaching the people due to government’s 
interruptions with internet through cyber blockades and blackouts.196 
However, the citizens have found creative and novel technology to outsmart 
government censorship and receive information using “international Domain 
Name System (“DNS”), the equivalent of an internet phonebook that connects 
URLs with numeric web addresses” and “virtual private networks (“VPNs”) 
to access the internet.”197 A similar trend is seen in Sri Lanka whenever there 
is a social media ban.198 
Sharing of information through apps such as WhatsApp and Twitter is 
not without its drawbacks, for fictions were shared via these sources just as 
much as fact.199 Since anyone can post and share information through social 
media without any scrutiny or cross-checking for accuracy, quality of 
information that is shared and its capacity to mislead the masses also becomes 
a serious issue. South Korean political actors were found guilty in engaging 
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in cyberwarfare to distort elections.200 Sri Lankan social media had to be shut 
down during anti-Muslim riots in 2018,201 in the aftermath of the Easter 
Sunday Attacks,202 and anti-Muslim riots triggered right afterward in 2019 
because of hate speech targeting religious and ethnic groups.203   
Therefore, it is crucial that the citizens are not merely active on social 
media, but that they have the “political competence” to participate in a 
substantial and effective manner.204  Nevertheless, the perpetual threat of 
misinformation is also compelling the citizens to be “smart news consumers” 
and Venezuelans have resorted to receive their news through Public 
Information Service, which is run by undercover journalists who distribute 
local news through WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter.205 Therefore, even 
though social media and internet-based mechanisms provide a powerful tool 
for dissemination of information and free expression, it is clear that it is not 
above manipulation. People are required to actively engage in activism and 
also exercise autonomous judgement to assess the quality of news shared for 
a constitutional movement to be successful.  
Also, during a situation of governmental abuse of power the citizens 
are generally united. Women, children, ethnic minorities and LGBTQ 
community206 of the countries have actively participated in these protests. But, 
the united protests at the face of an immediate threat do not guarantee 
adequate protection for minorities, especially in a heterogeneous context 
where tensions and mistrust between communities are high. Therefore, these 
countries run the risk of a majority violating the rights of minorities whenever 
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their citizenry is fragmented along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. Social 
media platforms, such as Google and Facebook, are designed to hold the 
attention of the users through algorithms that generate content, to which users 
have shown a prior preference.207 Artificial intelligence which run these 
platforms are geared to maximize profits through promotion of 
advertisements.208 However, through filtering of content to optimize preferred 
posts people become more and more polarized in politicized issues.209 This in 
turn makes negotiation, compromise and agreement harder. Studies have 
shown that rigidly held beliefs do not alter from social media consumption, 
but rather the extreme beliefs are consolidated thereunder.210 This conclusion 
is in line with the algorithmic function of social media platforms. 
Just as technology can amplify citizen voices during the protests, 
violence against minorities or any ostracized group can also be exacerbated 
through technology. This was the case in Sri Lanka, where ethnic mistrust was 
spread through fake news; the Aluthgama riots of 2014, Digana riots of 2018 
against Muslims, and 2019 Anti-Muslim riots in the aftermath of Easter 
Sunday Attacks were all exacerbated through social media.211  
B. Capacity to Influence the Institutions of The State  
Citizen protests act as a check upon government’s power abuses when 
the other branches of the government are failing to act effectively against such 
abuse of power. However, these citizen demands need to be championed by 
democratic institutions. In South Korea, President Park’s conservative Saenuri 
Party had lost its parliamentary majority in the most recent previous election. 
Therefore, the parliament was controlled by a coalition of opposition parties 
when the Candlelight Protests took place in 2016.212 The Candlelight Protests 
in South Korea led to a collaborated response by the legislature and the 
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judiciary. The Sri Lankan people’s movement’s demand to uphold the 
constitution was reiterated through the decisions of the Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeal.213 The Sri Lankan legislature, where the majority was in 
opposition to the president and his party, also attempted to align themselves 
with the people’s demands.214 Notably, even though there were threats of 
military involvement during the Constitutional Coup, the Sri Lankan military 
was not brought into alter the stakes during the power struggle. The absence 
of an exercise of military power by armed forces unchecked by the democratic 
branches of the state was significant in upholding constitutional principles. 
Notably, people’s constitutional movements have better success in 
getting the attention of state institutions based on the extent to which 
constitutional values are embedded in domestic governance. These 
movements have had better results in countries which have professed a 
commitment to democracy and rule of law rather than in countries where the 
leaders were openly autocratic. Overt dictators have had no qualms about 
using military power to suppress dissent, as was seen in the protests of 
Venezuela and Algeria as well as during the Arab Springs. But in South Korea 
and Sri Lanka, the rulers seemed more restrained in their resorting to violent 
means to repress the people’s movements.   
Because people’s constitutional movements have not had one or several 
leaders spearheading the process, channeling the energy into a state apparatus 
becomes a challenge. The Venezuelan example shows that people are placing 
their faith in Juan Guaidó to lead the transition to democracy at the level of a 
state apparatus. However, the embedded culture of authoritarianism is acting 
as a formidable barrier even in this instance where the movement has a 
potential champion to effectuate a change of governmental institutions. 
Meanwhile, South Korean protestors were more successful even when the 
constitutional movement was not guided by a leader or a group because the 
constitutional norms are comparatively embedded and acknowledged in the 
country. Strength of organized political dissent has been higher in Sri Lanka 
and South Korea, where there is a commitment to democracy and rule of law, 
even if such commitment is weak in practice. In turn, the presence of 
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institutional presence of organized dissent made the democratic institutions 
more amenable to the public demand. The Venezuelan opposition leader is 
also the President of the National State Assembly; however, the power of this 
institution is practically weak. The weaker democratic values are in the 
country, the harder it has been for people to make an impact through their 
movements. This shows the significance of embeddedness of constitutional 
values and democracy in the country for the success of people’s movements, 
an unfortunate paradox given the fact that citizens are mobilizing to transform 
a culture of authoritarianism in each of these instances.  
C. Achievement of Long-term Transformations  
Interaction between the people’s movement and branches of the state 
apparatus is important for the objectives of people to be ultimately achieved. 
However, the objectives of the people’s movements are often compromised as 
a result of this interaction. The South Korean narrative is more positive as the 
President was impeached while her advisors and the business tycoons 
involved in the scandal were convicted for their crimes.215 Nevertheless, the 
country is still grappling with longer-term systemic effects of corruption on 
its economy and the citizenry.  
Sri Lankans managed to restore the status quo; however, the president 
who violated the constitution remains in office and the government is 
struggling with the economic concerns of the nation. As corruption and 
violations of the constitution remain effectively unsanctioned, the extent to 
which citizens’ demands to uphold constitutional principles was achieved in 
the longer term is questionable. Political weakness arising from the 
constitutional coup whereby the president and the prime minister remain at 
loggerheads with each other proved fatal for the country during the Easter 
Sunday attacks, April 2019. In the aftermath of the attacks, the prime minister 
claimed that he was shut out of intelligence information and Security Council 
meetings while the president stated that he was not informed of the warnings 
against rising of a terrorist organization. Breakdown of coordination within 
the executive branch, alongside the weak legislature being unable to act as an 
effective check against the executive, resulted in severe damages to national 
security.  
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At the same time, both of these people’s movements aimed at and 
achieved a reformist agenda rather than a revolutionary overhaul of the entire 
constitutional and political backdrop. For instance, Algerian and Venezuelan 
people’s movements are seeking more dramatic “paradigm-shifting 
displacement[s] . . . in the conceptual prism through which constitutionalism 
is experienced in a given polity.”216 Therefore, resistance against these 
movements has been forceful and countries are facing severe instability in all 
spheres of life. Where the goals of the people’s constitutional movements have 
been less disruptive and targeted incremental change, negotiating for them has 
proven easier. However, the effectiveness of the system of constitutional 
checks and balances has been a crucial factor in the ultimate success of these 
interactions.  
The narrative of the Arabic world exemplifies the dangers of 
destabilization caused by people’s movements allowing for internal extremist 
forces striving power to seize the moment, causing unbearable economic 
consequences and external powers to intervene in a manner that is detrimental 
to countries’ interests.217 Therefore, the Arab Spring has brought forth mixed 
results, creating more chaos than stability in the long term. Venezuela and 
Algeria are running a similar risk of destabilization and further economic 
degradation. Whereas interactions with the organs of the state are crucial to 
successfully harness the people’s demands for constitutionalism and ensure 
the stability of the country, these very same interactions can dilute the vigor 
to achieve the constitutional principles due to weak institutional will and 
capacities.  
VII. CONCLUSION   
People’s movements to assert constitutional principles are a significant 
and formidable strand of popular constitutionalism. Advances in technology 
are providing people increased opportunities to engage in activism. 
Nevertheless, technology is not above manipulation, prejudice, hatred and 
divisive forces, which are detrimental for the political participation and 
fundamental rights of economically, educationally marginalized communities 
and ethnic, religious minorities. Channeling the energies of people’s 
constitutional movements towards achieving constitutional and governance 
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reforms is crucial to ensure the stability of the country and also achieve 
people’s goals in the longer term. While the force of united public demands 
can generate certain action on the part of the state apparatus, sooner or later 
people will once again face the corruption and weaknesses of the state 
structure which propelled them to activism. Consequently, success of the 
movement depends upon the robustness of democratic institutions, the very 
institutions which are structurally weak in presidential and semi-presidential 
systems. When people’s constitutional movements collide with the institutions 
of the state movements, either the people lose their revolutionary 
constitutional goals, or the countries face manifold levels of instability. 
Therefore, people’s movements that assert constitutional principles are an 
instance of popular constitutionalism, which faces complex dilemmas to 
achieve constitutionalism. 
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